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Comments
Parson v. Holman Erection Co.: The
Anomalous Treatment of Unemployed
Disabled Workers Under Minnesota's
Workers' Compensation Statute
Eddie Parson, a construction worker with Holman Erection
Company, injured his left knee while at work on August 20,
1984.1 Parson no longer could do construction work as a result
of the injury,2 and despite a diligent search to find an alterna-
tive job, he remained unemployed.3 Holman Erection Com-
pany, based on its understanding of Minnesota's workers'
compensation law, paid Parson wage loss benefits4 from the
time of his injury until ninety days after he had improved as
much as reasonably could be expected.5 Parson, believing the
law entitled him to receive wage loss benefits for as long as he
1. Parson v. Holman Erection Co., 428 N.W.2d 72, 74 (Minn. 1988).
Before injuring his left knee while working for Holman Erection Company
(Holman), Parson had injured his right knee on September 11, 1981, while
working for L. H. Sowles, Inc. (Sowles). Id Following surgery on his injured
right knee, Parson returned to work for Sowles, but eventually was laid off.
Id- When Parson sued his later employer, Holman, he also sued Sowles on the
theory that Sowles was liable for 50% of his total injury. Id. The compensa-
tion judge found that Parson's injury while an employee of Sowles contributed
to 50% of Parson's overall disability and held Sowles liable for 50% of the tem-
porary total wage loss benefits. Id- On appeal, the Workers' Compensation
Court of Appeals and the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed this award. Id.
at 77. The decision as to the liability of Sowles, however, is not the subject of
this Comment.
2. Id. at 74.
3. Id.
4. I& The wage loss benefits Holman paid Parson were in the form of
temporary total compensation. See infra notes 28-30 and accompanying text
for an explanation of the temporary total compensation provisions in the 1984
statute.
5. Parson, 428 N.W.2d at 74. When an employee has improved as much
as reasonably can be expected, the employee is issued a maximum medical im-
provement (MMI) report. See infra note 29. Ninety days after Parson re-
ceived this report, Holman ceased paying him temporary total wage loss
compensation. At that time, Holman began paying Parson loss of function
benefits in the form of economic recovery compensation. See infra notes 47-48
and accompanying text.
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remained disabled, filed a claim against the company.6
The compensation judge ruled that the company had met
its statutory obligations to Parson.7 On appeal, the Workers'
Compensation Court of Appeals disagreed8  and ordered
Holman to continue paying Parson wage loss benefits for the
duration of his disability.9 In Parson v. Holman Erection Co.,10
the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the appeals court, hold-
ing that Parson's entitlement to wage loss benefits ceased
ninety days after he had reached his maximum level of medical
improvement.'1
If Parson's work injury had occurred prior to 1984, Minne-
sota's workers' compensation law would have required Holman
Erection Company to pay Parson wage loss benefits for the du-
ration of his disability.12 In 1983, however, the Minnesota Leg-
islature revised major portions of the state's workers'
compensation law.13 The effect of the 1983 revisions on the
6. 428 N.W.2d at 74.
7. Id. In so ruling, the compensation judge determined that Parson was
totally disabled as of the date of the hearing. There was no appeal from that
finding. Parson v. Holman Erection Co., No. 425-66-5224, at 4 (Workers' Comp.
Ct. App. May 4, 1987).
8. Parson v. Holnan Erection Co., No. 425-66-5224, at 4 (Workers' Comp.
Ct. App. May 4, 1987). Holman's share of Parson's temporary total disability
was 50% because Parson injured only his left knee while employed by
Holman. See supra note 1. The court noted that the uncontroverted medical
testimony in the case showed that Parson "was not permanently and totally
disabled but that he could not return to work at his former occupation." Par-
son, No. 425-66-5224, at 4.
9. Parson, No. 425-66-5524, at 7. The Worker's Compensation Court of
Appeals ruled that, although Parson's right to temporary total wage loss com-
pensation ceased 90 days after he reached MMI, he was entitled to receive
temporary partial wage loss compensation calculated at the temporary total
compensation rate for the duration of his disability. See infra notes 38-39 and
accompanying text.
10. 428 N.W.2d 72 (Minn. 1988).
11. Id at 76. Sowles did not appeal. Id at 77.
In his suit against Holman, Parson raised three additional issues. First, he
'challenged the constitutionality of MINN. STAT. § 176.101 (1984). Second, Par-
son argued that he was entitled to receive temporary total compensation after
full payment of economic recovery compensation. Third, Parson asserted that
if Holman did not have to pay him temporary partial compensation at the tem-
porary total rate, Sowles then was liable for temporary total disability benefits
at 100% of the compensation rate because the 1981 injury was a substantial
contributing factor to his disability. The Supreme Court ruled against Parson
on all three issues, none of which is the topic of this Comment. See infra note
75.
12. See infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
13. See Act of June 7, 1983, ch. 290, 1983 Minn. Laws 1310 (codified at
MINN. STAT. chs. 43A, 79, 147, 148, 175, 176, 268, 346, 471 (1984)). Extensive
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type and duration of benefits available to injured workers was
not immediately clear.' 4 Parson raised the issue whether,
under the revised statute, partially disabled employees who
cannot find alternative work despite diligent efforts are enti-
tled to wage loss benefits beyond ninety days after reaching
maximum medical improvement.15 This issue frequently con-
fronts injured workers. 16
criticism of Minnesota's pre-1984 workers' compensation law prompted the
system overhaul. Critics noted the system's high cost to employers and insur-
ers in comparison to the cost of workers' compensation in surrounding states,
the high rate of litigation the system generated, the amount of disability the
system compensated, the lack of incentives for employers to provide proper re-
habilitation to injured employees, and the lack of incentives for employees to
cooperate with rehabilitation. See C. WILLIAMS, JR., R. AZEVEDO, M. BOGN-
NANO, & P. SCHUMANN, MINNESOTA WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS AND
COSTS: AN OBJEcTrivE ANALYSIS 74-97 (1983) (recommending the elimination
of the open-ended nature of temporary total disability benefits); see also CITI-
ZENS LEAGUE, WORKERS' COMPENSATION REFORM: GET THE EMPLOYEES BACK
ON THE JOB 37-47 (1982) (recommending incentives for employers to prevent
injuries and to take injured workers back to work, and rewards for employees
who return to work quickly after injury); MINNESOTA INSURANCE DIVISION,
WORKERS' COMPENSATION IN MINNESOTA: AN ANALYSIS WITH RECOMMENDA-
TIONS 205-08 (1982) (recommending the addition of incentives which facilitate a
faster return to work by injured workers); MINNESOTA WORKERS' COMPENSA-
TION STUDY COMMISSION, A REPORT TO THE MINNESOTA LEGISLATURE AND
GOVERNOR 105-27 (1979) (including a comparison of Minnesota's workers' com-
pensation insurance premium rates to those in other jurisdictions).
14. See infra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
15. 428 N.W.2d at 74. The issue as framed in the plaintiff's brief was
whether the 1983 amendments eliminate an unemployed injured worker's en-
titlement to temporary total compensation 90 days after service of a maximum
medical improvement report. Brief for Respondent at 1, Parson v. Holman
Erection Co., 428 N.W.2d 72 (Minn. 1988) (No. C5-87-1037). By its decision,
however, the court not only answered the stated question but also answered
the question whether the 1983 amendments eliminate an unemployed injured
employee's entitlement to temporary partial benefits at a rate other than the
temporary total compensation rate. Parson, 428 N.W.2d at 76.
16. Since deciding Parson, the Supreme Court repeatedly has relied on
Parson to deny temporary partial wage loss benefits to unemployed injured
workers after 90 days past maximum medical improvement. See Berard v.
Johnson Greenline, Inc., 428 N.W.2d 389, 389 (Minn. 1988) (relying on Parson
to deny employee concurrent economic recovery compensation and temporary
partial compensation at the temporary total rate); Ryan v. Jorgenson Chevro-
let, 426 N.W.2d 889, 889 (Minn. 1988) (same); Bue v. Saint Otto's Home, 427
N.W.2d 247, 247 (Minn. 1988) (relying on Parson to deny employee temporary
partial compensation at the temporary total rate); Dengerud v. Utley-James,
Inc., 427 N.W.2d 673, 674 (Minn. 1988) (same); Shipton v. George A. Hormel &
Co., 426 N.W.2d 888, 888 (Minn. 1988) (same); Giese v. Green Giant Co., 426
N.W.2d 879, 880 (Minn. 1988) (same); Lamont v. Schmidt Brewing, 426 N.W.2d
883, 883 (Minn. 1988) (same); Tews v. George A. Hormel & Co., 430 N.W.2d
178, 180 (Minn. 1988) (same); Swenson v. SMA Elevator Constr., 430 N.W.2d
668, 668 (Minn. 1988) (same); Morrissey v. Country Club Markets, Inc., 430
1989]
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This Comment disagrees with the Parson court's conclu-
sion that the 1983 legislature intended to eliminate wage loss
compensation for disabled workers who remain unemployed
ninety days past maximum medical improvement. Part I sum-
marizes pertinent provisions of Minnesota's workers' compen-
sation statute prior to the 1983 amendments and related case
law. Part I further summarizes the 1983 amendments relevant
to compensation for injured employees and the Minnesota
Supreme Court's interpretation of the new law's effect on dis-
abled employees who secure other employment. Part II de-
scribes the Parson court's analysis of the new law's effect on
disabled employees who remain unemployed despite a diligent
search for work. Part III argues that the Parson majority in-
correctly interpreted the new law's wage loss compensation
provisions as applied to injured workers who remain unem-
ployed. This Comment concludes that the Minnesota Legisla-
ture should amend its workers' compensation statute to clarify
the wage loss compensation provisions for disabled workers
who remain unemployed ninety days past maximum medical
improvement.
I. STATUTORY AND CASE LAW BACKGROUND
Minnesota's workers' compensation statute provides in-
jured employees two major types of benefits: wage loss benefits
and loss of function benefits.' 7 Wage loss benefits protect an
employee against loss or reduction of earnings resulting from a
work-related injury.'5 Loss of function benefits compensate an
employee for any permanent physical impairment due to the
work-related injury.19 Wage loss and loss of function compen-
N.W.2d 169, 170 (Minn. 1988) (relying on Parson to deny employee temporary
partial benefits for period of unemployment after reaching maximum medical
improvement); Svenningsen v. Feinberg Distrib. Co., 432 N.W.2d 758, 758
(Minn. 1988) (same).
17. The workers' compensation statute also provides compensatory reim-
bursement for all reasonable and necessary medical costs resulting from the
work-related injury (MINN. STAT. § 176.135 (1988)), rehabilitation or retraining
benefits to injured employees (MINN. STAT. § 176.102 (1988)), and permanent
total disability (MINN. STAT. § 176.101 subd. 4 (1988)). Permanent total disabil-
ity benefits are available to employees whose injuries leave them totally inca-
pacitated, thus unable to work at any occupation. MINN. STAT. § 176.101 subd.
5 (1988). These four provisions are not directly relevant to this Comment.
18. See MINN. STAT. § 176.021 subd. 3 (1988). Wage loss benefits include
temporary total compensation and temporary partial compensation. MINN.
STAT. § 176.101 subds. 1, 2 (1988).
19. MINN. STAT. § 176.021 subd. 3 (1988). The 1982 statute labeled loss of
function benefits as "permanent partial disability" compensation. MINN. STAT.
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sation thus are separate and distinct benefits.20
A. WAGE Loss BENEFITS
Minnesota's workers' compensation statute sets forth two
provisions governing wage loss benefits: temporary total bene-
fits21 (total benefits) and temporary partial benefits22 (partial
benefits).
Prior to the 1983 amendments, an injured employee quali-
fied for total benefits when she was unable to engage in any
substantial gainful employment.23 An employee could demon-
strate total incapacitation either by showing a physical impair-
ment that prevented her from working,4 or by demonstrating
that a physical impairment combined with certain vocational
factors resulted in a lack of available jobs.25 Thus, although an
§ 176.101 subd. 3 (1982). The statute now labels loss of function benefits as
"economic recovery compensation" and "impairment compensation." MINN.
STAT. § 176.101 subds. 3a, 3b (1988).
20. MiNN. STAT. § 176.021 subd. 3 (1988).
21. MINN. STAT. § 176.101 subd. 1 (1988).
22. 1d, subd. 2.
23. Id, subd. 5 (1982). An injured employee who qualified as temporarily
totally disabled was entitled to two-thirds of her daily wage at the time of the
injury subject to specified maximum and minimum payments. Id. subd. 1. The
maximum weekly benefits payable were equal to the statewide average weekly
wage (SAWW) for the preceding year. The minimum weekly benefits payable
were to be not less than 50% of the SAWW or the injured employee's actual
weekly wage, whichever was less. Payment was to be made as nearly as possi-
ble at the intervals when the wage was payable. Id. See generally Crochiere,
The Plight of the Displaced Employee Improves: An Analysis of the 1983
Changes to Minnesota's Workers' Compensation System, 12 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 623, 629-39 (1986) (discussing benefits under the pre-1983 statute); Alt-
man, Benanav, Keefe & Volz, Minnesota's Workers' Compensation Scheme:
The Effects and Effectiveness of the 1983 Amendments, 13 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 843, 860-64 (1987)(same).
24. These injuries included the
total and permanent loss of the sight of both eyes, the loss of both
arms at the shoulder, the loss of both legs so close to the hips that no
effective artificial members can be used, complete and permanent pa-
ralysis, total and permanent loss of mental faculties or any other in-
jury which totally incapacitates the employee from working at an
occupation which brings him an income.
INN. STAT. § 176.101 subd. 5 (1982).
25. Relevant vocational factors included the injured employee's age, train-
ing, and work experience. See, e.g., Schulte v. C.H. Peterson Constr. Co., 278
Minn. 79, 82-83, 153 N.W.2d 130, 133-34 (1967) (holding that determination of
total disability is not solely determined by the employee's physical condition);
Castle v. City of Stillwater, 235 Minn. 502, 506, 51 N.W.2d 370, 372 (1952) (rul-
ing that in defining total disability, losses in bodily function are important only
as they relate to ability to earn an income).
To prove inability to find and hold a job, an injured employee must
1989]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
employee was physically able to perform some types of work,
she was considered totally disabled if there were no available
jobs given her vocational profile. As long as an employee met
the criteria for total disability, she could continue to receive to-
tal benefits for an indeterminate period.
26
As amended in 1983,27 Minnesota's workers' compensation
law continues to provide total benefits to incapacitated work-
ers.2s The amended law, however, terminates an employee's to-
tal benefits ninety days after the employee achieves maximum
medical improvement (MMI)29 rather than continuing them
demonstrate a reasonably diligent search for alternative employment. See
Crochiere, supra note 23, at 629-30. See infra note 36 and accompanying text
for court interpretation of "reasonably diligent search."
26. The statute provided that "compensation shall be paid during the pe-
riod of disability." MINN. STAT. § 176.101 subd. 1 (1982). See Henry v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 286 N.W.2d 720, 723 (Minn. 1979) (holding that "termination of
temporary total disability benefits must be based either on a finding that the
employee is no longer temporarily totally disabled... or on a finding that the
employee intended to retire on a specific date regardless of his or her
disability").
27. See Act of June 7, 1983, ch. 290, 1983 Minn. Laws 1310 (codified at
MINN. STAT. chs. 43A, 79, 147-48, 175-76, 268, 346, 471 (1984). Commentators
cite various legislative goals of the new system. See, e.g., Crochiere, supra note
23, at 654 (citing four goals of the 1983 amendments: to reduce costs in the sys-
tem, to make the system more equitable, to encourage a faster return to work
for the displaced employee, and to make the system less uncertain); Altman,
supra note 23, at 867 (citing three principles on which the new system was
based: create an economic incentive for employers/insurers to find a suitable
job for the injured employee; eliminate the open-ended system of weekly tem-
porary total disability benefits; create incentives for injured employees to ac-
cept a suitable job by financially rewarding them for returning to work). For a
general discussion of the benefits available under the revised statute see
Crochiere, supra note 23, at 646-54, and Altman, supra note 23, at 869-99.
28. MINN. STAT. § 176.101 subd. 1 (1988). A temporarily totally disabled
employee is entitled to two-thirds of her daily wage at the time of the injury.
The maximum temporary total compensation available continues to be subject
to the statewide average weekly wage (SAWW) for the preceding year with the
minimum not to be less than 50% of the SAWW or the injured employee's ac-
tual weekly wage, whichever is less. The compensation is to be paid at the in-
tervals when the wage was payable, or as nearly as may be. Id.
29. Maximum medical improvement (MMI) is the date "after which no
further significant recovery from or significant lasting improvement to a per-
sonal injury can reasonably be anticipated, based upon reasonable medical
probability." MINN. STAT. § 176.011 subd. 25 (1988). MMI is to be based on ob-
jective findings and the patient's rate of recovery and should not be based on
arbitrary time periods. Because individual healing rates vary, two employees
with identical injuries may achieve UMI at different rates. Each case thus
should be analyzed separately. See Altman, supra note 23, at 869-870 n.106.
After an employer receives a written medical report indicating that the em-
ployee has reached MMI, the employer serves a copy of the report upon the




Partial benefits,3 1 the second type of wage loss compensa-
tion provided under the statute, extend to those employees
who, despite their injuries, are able to work subject to certain
medical restrictions.32 Prior to the 1983 amendments, injured
workers could qualify for partial benefits regardless of whether
they were employed. 33 The rate of compensation varied, how-
ever, depending on the worker's employment status.34 Workers
who found alternative jobs received partial benefits calculated
on the basis of their earning capacity in their disabled condi-
tion.35 Workers who could not find jobs after a "reasonably dil-
30. MINN. STAT. § 176.101 subd. 3e(a) (1988). Alternatively, an employee's
total benefits cease 90 days after he completes an approved retraining pro-
gram, if that date is later. Id.
The statute further provides that an employer may cease paying an em-
ployee temporary total compensation during the 90-day period after MMI if
the employee retires, if the employer furnishes the employee suitable work, or
if the employee accepts a suitable job with another employer. MMN. STAT.
§ 176.101 subd. 3e(b) (1988). To be "suitable," the job must be consistent with
an approved plan of rehabilitation or be one an injured employee can do in her
physical condition, and it must produce an economic status as close as possible
to the status the employee would have enjoyed without the disability. Id
An employee who refuses an offer of suitable employment suffers several
consequences. The employee loses her entitlement to temporary total com-
pensation. MINN. STAT. § 176.101 subd. 31 (1988). Moreover, upon refusal the
employee becomes ineligible for temporary partial benefits if she subsequently
returns to work at a lower wage than her pre-injury employment. MINN.
STAT. § 176.101 subd. 3n (1988). Additionally, the employee who refuses a suit-
able job offer loses her eligibility for any rehabilitation benefits offered under
the statute. Id
An employer also may cease paying temporary total benefits before the
employee reaches MMI if the employer provides the employee with an appro-
priate job, or if the employee accepts an appropriate job from another em-
ployer. MINN. STAT. § 176.101 subd. 3f (1988).
31. MINN. STAT. § 176.101 subd. 2 (1988).
32. Id Prior to the 1974 amendments, the Minnesota Supreme Court
listed four factors necessary for an employee to qualify under the statute:
there must be a physical disability; the disability must be temporary rather
than permanent; the injury must be partial, allowing the employee to work
subject to the disability; and the employee must suffer an actual loss of earn-
ing capacity that is causally related to the disability. Dorn v. A.J. Chromy
Constr. Co., 310 Minn. 42, 47, 245 N.W.2d 451, 454 (1976). After amendments to
the workers' compensation statute in 1974, the court revised its definition to
exclude the requirement that the injury must be temporary rather than per-
manent. Morehouse v. George A. Hormel & Co., 313 N.W.2d 8, 10 (Minn.
1981).
33. The compensation was payable when the wage was payable, and was
subject to a maximum amount equal to the statewide average weekly wage.
M1 1N. STAT. § 176.101 subd. 2 (1982).
34. Id
35. d. Workers who found alternative jobs received two-thirds of the dif-
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igent effort" to do so received partial benefits calculated on the
basis of their pre-injury wage.36 Both employed and unem-
ployed workers thus received partial benefits for an indetermi-
ference between their pre-injury wage and their post-injury wage. Actual
earnings by an employee with a temporary partial disability created a pre-
sumption of earning capacity. When actual earnings and earning capacity were
dissimilar, however, the actual earning capacity of the disabled worker re-
mained the determining factor for calculation of benefits. See, e.g., Owens v.
Pako Corp., 386 N.W.2d 711, 715 (Minn. 1986) (finding that employee's actual
earnings, divided by the number of weeks in which he earned that amount,
equaled his earning capacity); Olson v. Midwest Printing Co., 347 N.W.2d 43, 47
(Minn. 1984) (holding that "a retrained commission salesperson's earning ca-
pacity be determined based on actual earnings, but only for a reasonable pe-
riod of time during which the person is making a diligent effort to succeed in
the occupation of retraining"). Cf Roberts v. Motor Cargo, Inc., 258 Minn. 425,
430, 104 N.W.2d 546, 550 (1960) (acknowledging that the Minnesota Supreme
Court has held that "it is not what the employee earns after the injury but
what the employee is able to earn which is determinative" in temporary par-
tial disability cases, but concluding that concrete evidence of earnings "creates
a presumption of earning capacity").
36. MINN. STAT. § 176.101 subd. 2 (1982). The effect of paying unemployed
injured workers partial benefits calculated on the basis of their pre-injury
wage was to pay such workers "at the full compensation rate for his or her
temporary total disability." Id The statute thus classified a temporary partial
disability as a temporary total disability for the purpose of wage loss compen-
sation. Furthermore, "the distinction between temporary partial and tempo-
rary total disability" became blurred because the statute required an injured
employee to perform a diligent search for work to qualify for temporary par-
tial disability benefits at the temporary total rate, and the same search was re-
quired to qualify for temporary total disability. Crochiere, supra note 23, at
631. See, e.g., Mayer v. Erickson Decorators, 372 N.W.2d 729, 731 (Minn. 1985)
(holding that to remain entitled to receive temporary partial disability com-
pensation, an employee must cooperate with rehabilitation efforts, including
those aimed at returning him to employment through a reasonably diligent ef-
fort to obtain employment); Wesley v. City of Detroit Lakes, 344 N.W.2d 614,
617 (Minn. 1984) (holding that an employee is entitled to temporary partial
disability benefits at the temporary total disability rate even though he refused
an offer of employment within his physical limitations because he made a
good-faith effort to accept the job offer within a reasonable time, and contin-
ued to make a good faith effort to find other work within his physical limita-
tions); Paine v. Beek's Pizza, 323 N.W.2d 812, 816 (Minn. 1982) (finding that an
employee who voluntarily removed himself from the labor market by moving
from a metropolitan area to a rural area where no employment opportunities
existed had not made a reasonably diligent effort to secure work and thus was
not entitled to temporary partial disability benefits at the total disability rate).
Compare Petschl v. Britton Motor Serv., 323 N.W.2d 788, 790 (Minn. 1982)
(holding that an employee who lived 60 miles from a metropolitan area and
was employed in that metropolitan area when he sustained his work-related
injury was not entitled to temporary partial benefits at the temporary total
disability rate if he refused to seek work in the metropolitan area) with Fre-
denburg v. Control Data Corp., 311 N.W.2d 860, 864-65 (Minn. 1981) (holding
that temporary partial benefits at the temporary total rate shall continue be-
cause employee whose injury precludes commuting is not required to seek sub-
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nate period, but the benefits received were calculated on a
different basis.3 7
Under the statute as amended in 1983, eligible workers
continue to receive partial benefits for an indeterminate pe-
riod.38 The only change the legislature made in the partial ben-
efits provision was to delete the sentence providing that
unemployed workers be compensated at the full compensation
rate.39 This change raised the issue, addressed in Parson,
whether a disabled worker who remains unemployed after
stitute employment that requires commuting, as long as he has made a
reasonably diligent effort to find suitable work within his own community).
37. MINN. STAT. § 176.101 subd. 2 (1982). The statute provided that "com-
pensation shall be paid during the period of disability." Id- See, e.g., French v.
Minnesota Cash Register, 341 N.W.2d 290, 292 (Minn. 1983) (finding that an
employee who refused an offer of light work was entitled to continue receiving
temporary partial disability payments because at the time the offer was made
the seriousness of the injury was not recognized by the treating doctors or by
the employer).
38. The statute, in pertinent part, provides that "[ain employee who ac-
cepts a job under subdivision 3e or subdivision 3f and begins that job shall re-
ceive temporary partial compensation pursuant to subdivision 2, if
appropriate." MINN. STAT. § 176.101 subd. 3h (1988). A subdivision 3e or 3f job
is one that is consistent with an employee's rehabilitation plan, or one that the
employee can do in her disabled condition and which produces an economic
status as close as possible to that which the employee would have enjoyed
without the disability. Id. subds. 3e(b), 3f.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has interpreted the language of subdivi-
sion 3h to mean that an employee's temporary partial compensation shall con-
tinue for as long as a new job pays less than the pre-injury wage. See infra
notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
Temporary partial compensation for those injured employees who procure
other employment continues to be two-thirds of the difference between the
weekly wage of the employee at the time of injury and the wage the employee
is able to earn in the employee's partially disabled condition. MuMN. STAT.
§ 176.101 subd. 2 (1988).
39. The deleted sentence, as contained in the 1982 statute, read as follows:
If the employer does not furnish the worker with work which he can
do in his temporary partially disabled condition and he is unable to
procure such work with another employer, after reasonably diligent
effort, the employee shall be paid at the full compensation rate for his
or her temporary total disability.
MINN. STAT. § 176.101 subd. 2 (1982).
As amended in 1983, subdivision 2 now provides:
Temporary partial disability In all cases of temporary partial disabil-
ity the compensation shall be 66-2/3 percent of the difference between
the weekly wage of the employee at the time of injury and the wage
the employee is able to earn in the employee's partially disabled con-
dition. This compensation shall be paid during the period of disability
except as provided in this section, payment to be made at the intervals
when the wage was payable, as nearly as may be, and subject to a
maximum compensation equal to the statewide average weekly wage.
MINN. STAT. § 176.101 subd. 2 (1988).
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reaching maximum medical improvement despite diligent ef-
forts to find an alternative job is entitled to receive partial
wage loss benefits at the total benefit rate.
B. Loss OF FUNCTION BENEFITS
Prior to the 1983 amendments, the workers' compensation
statute provided loss of function benefits to employees who,
due to their injury, permanently lost the use of one or more
body parts.40 Statutory formulas determined the amount and
duration of the compensation,41 and the same formulas were
used for both employed and unemployed workers.42 Disabled
employees received this loss of function compensation in addi-
tion to their wage loss compensation.
43
As amended in 1983, the law continues to provide loss of
function compensation to employees who permanently lose the
use of one or more body parts as a result of their injury.
44
Rather than using the same formula to calculate benefits for all
workers, however, the revised statute incorporates a two-tiered
system that distinguishes the employed from the unemployed
worker.45 Under this new two-tiered structure, a disabled
40. MINN. STAT. § 176.101 subd. 3 (1982). See generally Crochiere, supra
note 23, at 632 (explaining Minnesota pre-1983 permanent partial disability
benefits); Altman, supra note 23, at 861-64 (discussing permanent partial disa-
bility benefits).
41. MINN. STAT. § 176.101 subd. 3 (1982). The statute provided both sched-
uled and non-scheduled permanent partial disability benefits. Scheduled inju-
ries were those listed in the statute. An employee who suffered one of the
"scheduled" injuries received compensation calculated according to the statu-
tory formula. The formula specified what percentage of the employee's daily
wage at the time of the injury the employer was required to pay and the
length of time that the employer was required to continue paying the compen-
sation. IE For example, an employee who lost a thumb received 66 2/3% of
his daily wage at the time of the injury for a period of 65 weeks. Id. subd. 3(1).
An employee who suffered a "non-scheduled" injury received two-thirds of the
difference between the employee's daily wage at the time of the injury and the
employee's daily wage in his disabled condition. I&r subd. 3(49). The amount
of compensation was subject to a maximum equal to the statewide average
weekly wage. Id subd. 3.
42. The only difference between employed and unemployed permanently
partially disabled workers was the treatment of "non-scheduled" injuries. See
supra note 41. If the employer did not furnish work to an employee with a
non-scheduled injury and the employee was unable to secure such work on his
own after a reasonably diligent effort, the statute required an employer to pay
the injured employee benefits at the maximum rate of compensation for total
disability. MINN. STAT. § 176.101 subd. 3(49) (1982).
43. MNN. STAT. § 176.021 subd. 3 (1982).
44. MINN. STAT. § 176.101 subds. 3a, 3b (1988).
45. I& subd. 3e.
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worker who successfully finds alternative employment receives
impairment compensation, 46 while a disabled worker who can-
not find alternative work receives economic recovery compen-
sation.47 Economic recovery compensation, computed using a
different formula from the impairment compensation formula,
provides significantly higher loss of function benefits than does
impairment compensation.
48
Before the 1983 amendments, employed and unemployed
workers received both wage loss benefits and loss of function
benefits.49 Under the revised law, an employed disabled worker
who reaches maximum medical improvement can receive both
wage loss benefits and loss of function benefits.50 Parson, how-
46. Id. subds. 3b, 3e(b).
47. Id subd. 3a. Impairment compensation and economic recovery com-
pensation thus are mutually exclusive. IM subd. 3e(b).
48. Both impairment compensation and economic recovery compensation
are determined by statutory formulas. IMi subds. 3a, 3b. To calculate the
amount of compensation an injured worker receives, the first step is to deter-
mine the percentage of disability that the loss of function of the disabled part
bears to the whole body. MnN. STAT. § 176.105 subd. 4 (1988).
For economic recovery compensation, the percentage of disability is multi-
plied by the number of weeks aligned with that percentage in the statutory
schedule, which then is multiplied by 66-2/3% of the employee's weekly wage
at the time of the injury. MINN. STAT. § 176.101 subd. 3a (1988). For example,
an injured worker who has suffered a 25% disability receives .25 (percent of
disability) multiplied by 600 (weeks of compensation) multiplied by 66-2/3% of
the pre-injury weekly wage. If the employee earned $200 a week at the time
of her injury, the amount of the economic recovery compensation would be
$20,000.
For impairment compensation, the percentage of disability is multiplied
by the amount aligned with that percentage in the statutory schedule. Id.
subd. 3b. For example, an injured worker who has suffered a 25% disability
receives .25 (percent of disability) multiplied by $75,000 (amount aligned with
that percent in the statutory schedule) for a total of $18,750. The employee's
former weekly wage is not part of the impairment compensation formula. See
generally Crochiere, supra note 23, at 651-53 (comparing impairment compen-
sation to economic recovery compensation). Regardless of the statutory for-
mulas, however, the statute provides that economic recovery compensation
always will be at least 20% higher than impairment compensation. MINN.
STAT. § 176.101 subd. 3t (1988).
Other major differences between impairment compensation and economic
recovery compensation include the following- impairment compensation is
usually paid in a lump sum, economic recovery compensation is paid as a
weekly benefit; impairment compensation generally will not be affected by in-
creases in average wages, whereas economic recovery will increase over time
as average wages increase. See Altman, supra note 23, at 868-69. The statute
prohibits an injured employee from receiving either economic recovery com-
pensation or impairment compensation concurrently with temporary total
compensation. MINN. STAT. § 176.101 subds. 3e(b), 3p (1988).
49. MINN. STAT. § 176.021 subd. 3 (1982).
50. See infra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
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ever, changed the system so that an unemployed disabled
worker receives only loss of function benefits after reaching
maximum medical improvement.5'
C. COURT INTERPRETATION OF THE 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE
TEMPORARY PARTIAL COMPENSATION PROVISIONS
Prior to its Parson decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court
consistently refused to find limitations on benefits that the stat-
ute did not specifically mandate.52 The court held, for example,
that the 1983 amendments to the workers' compensation stat-
ute provide no specific termination date for partial wage loss
benefits and, consequently, did not judicially impose a limita-
tion.5 3 The court also broadly interpreted the amended statute
to allow a worker with a permanent partial disability who
secures alternative employment to receive both wage loss and
loss of function benefits concurrently.M
In Patton v. Thompson Electric Co.,55 the court ruled that a
disabled employee who has found an alternative job is entitled
to partial wage loss benefits for as long as his new job pays less
than his pre-injury wage. 56 The Patton court explained that
whenever a post-injury job pays less than a pre-injury wage, an
employee is entitled to partial wage loss benefits to bring the
job within the statutory requirement of economic suitability.
57
A job is economically suitable only if it allows the worker to
51. Parson, 428 N.W.2d at 76.
52. See Gasper v. Northern Star Co., 422 N.W.2d 727 (Minn. 1988); Patton
v. Thompson Elec. Co., 420 N.W.2d 596 (Minn. 1988); Winchester v. Pako
Corp., 420 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1988).
53. See Gasper, 422 N.W.2d at 730; Patton, 420 N.W.2d at 598; Winchester,
420 N.W.2d at 588.
54. See Gasper, 422 N.W.2d at 731; Patton, 420 N.W.2d at 597; Winchester,
420 N.W.2d at 588.
55. 420 N.W.2d 596 (Minn. 1988).
56. Id at 598. The court rejected the employer's argument that because
MtINN. STAT. § 176.101 subd. 3e(a) (1984) requires cessation of temporary total
compensation 90 days after an injured employee reaches maximum medical
improvement, temporary partial disability benefits also must cease at that
time. Id The court emphasized that the statute contains no specific provision
for the cessation of temporary partial benefits as it does for the cessation of
temporary total benefits. Id. The court further emphasized that "if the legis-
lature had intended such a 'major change' in the way temporary partial bene-
fits were to be paid, the legislature would have put that in the new law." Id.
See also Winchester, 420 N.W.2d at 588 (holding that an employee who injured
her back while working and who secured employment with another company
at a reduced wage was entitled to temporary partial disability compensation
"so long as the disability shall warrant").
57. Patton, 420 N.W.2d at 598.
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enjoy an economic status "as close as possible" to the economic
status he would have enjoyed without the injury.58
The Patton decision further held that an injured employee
with an alternative job is entitled to impairment compensation
for any permanent physical disability.59 The court explained
that wage loss benefits and loss of function benefits are sepa-
rate benefits.60 Therefore, an injured worker may receive par-
tial wage loss benefits concurrently with impairment
compensation benefits.6 1
In Gasper v. Northern Star Co., 62 the court extended its
reasoning in Patton and held that an injured employee who
finds an alternative job is entitled to receive partial wage loss
benefits concurrently with economic recovery compensation.63
In Gasper, the court ignored the fact that economic recovery
compensation, which normally goes to unemployed workers,
provides significantly higher benefits than does impairment
compensation, which goes to employed workers. The court in-
stead focused on the distinct and separate purposes of wage loss
benefits and loss of function benefits.4 The court concluded
that because wage loss benefits compensate an injured worker
for lost or reduced wages, and economic recovery compensation
pays the injured worker for functional loss, "the employee re-
ceives no double benefit" by receiving both benefits
concurrently. 6
5
Based on Minnesota Supreme Court decisions in Patton
and Gasper, a partially disabled employee who finds some type
of alternative employment is entitled to wage loss benefits and
58. MINN. STAT. § 176.101 subd. 3e(b) (1984).
59. Patton, 420 N.W.2d at 598. The court, citing M-N. STAT. § 176.101
subd. 3f (1984), noted that the employee started working at a suitable job
before reaching MMI and thus was eligible under the statute for impairment
compensation. Id- at 597. See also Winchester, 420 N.W.2d at 588 (upholding
award of temporary partial compensation 90 days past MMI to employee who
was working at a suitable job).
60. Patton, 420 N.W.2d at 597.
61. Id.
62. 422 N.W.2d 727 (Minn. 1988).
63. Id at 731. Because none of the three jobs Gasper found met the crite-
ria of suitability under subd. 3e, the parties agreed that Gasper was entitled to
economic recovery compensation. Id.
64. Id-
65. Id The court explained that the language of the statute defines eco-
nomic recovery and impairment compensation as "separate, distinct, and in ad-
dition to payment for any other compensation." Id See MINN. STAT. § 176.021




loss of function benefits. The wage loss benefits as provided
under the partial compensation provision also may continue for
an indeterminate period.66 In Parson, the court considered
whether wage loss benefits extend to a partially disabled em-
ployee who remains unemployed ninety days after reaching
maximum medical improvement. 67 In other words, the court
considered whether the employee is entitled to temporary par-
tial benefits after the employee's right to total benefits expires.
II. THE PARSON COURT'S ANALYSIS
In Parson v. Holman Erection Co., the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that, under the 1983 amendments to Minnesota's
workers' compensation statute, an injured worker who has not
found a job within ninety days after reaching maximum medi-
cal improvement is not entitled to receive partial wage loss ben-
efits at the total wage loss benefit rate.68 In so holding, the
court effectively prohibited any wage loss benefits for the un-
employed injured employee ninety days after the employee
reaches maximum medical improvement.
To reach its holding, the court acknowledged criticism of
the pre-1984 law's open-ended availability of total wage loss
benefits.6 9 The court explained that, under the statute as
amended in 1983, an injured employee's entitlement to total
wage loss benefits is of limited duration.70 The court empha-
sized that the plain language of the revised statute mandates
termination of an employee's total wage loss benefits ninety
days past maximum medical improvement. 71
The court next determined that the 1983 legislature made
only one substantive change in the old law's partial wage loss
66. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
67. 428 N.W.2d at 74.
68. Id at 76.
69. Id at 74-75. The court nevertheless acknowledged that in addition to
eliminating the open-ended nature of temporary total compensation, other
goals of the 1983 legislature included providing economic incentives for em-
ployers to provide suitable employment for injured employees and providing
still other economic incentives encouraging employees to accept suitable em-
ployment. Id. at 76.
70. Id at 75.
71. Id The relevant part of subdivision 3e(a) states that "[n]inety days af-
ter an employee has reached maximum medical improvement or 90 days after
the end of an approved retraining program, whichever is later, the employee's




provision.72 This change deleted the sentence providing partial
wage loss benefits at the total compensation rate to workers
who remain unemployed despite a diligent search to find alter-
native work.7 3
The court noted that the legislature amended the statute
by removing the term "disability" from the statutory provisions
describing temporary wage replacement benefits.7 4 The court
concluded from these two amendments that the legislature in-
tended to preclude injured employees who are unable to find
work from receiving partial wage loss benefits.75 The court ac-
cordingly held that Minnesota law does not allow an unem-
ployed injured worker to receive partial wage loss benefits at
the total compensation rate because a contrary decision would
render meaningless the statute's requirement that total com-
pensation cease ninety days past maximum medical
improvement.
76
72. 428 N.W.2d at 75. The provision is contained in MINN. STAT. § 176.101
subd. 2 (1984).
73. Id. For the text of the deleted sentence, see supra note 39.
74. Id. at 76. The court emphasized that the new law no longer includes
the terms "temporary total disability compensation" and "temporary partial
disability benefits" to describe temporary wage replacement benefits. The
court pointed out that the new law uses the terms "temporary total compensa-
tion" and "temporary partial compensation." Id- See MINN. STAT. § 176.101
subds. 3a-3u (1984). Given that the legislature meant to establish a new format
for workers' compensation, the court concluded that the changed language
meant something different from the language of the old statute. 428 N.W.2d at
76. The court provided no explanation of the relevance of this change and
none is apparent.
75. 428 N.W.2d at 76. The court also rejected all the plaintiff's other
claims. The court rejected plaintiff's attack on the constitutionality of MINN.
STAT. § 176.101 (1984), holding that "the statutory limitation of temporary to-
tal compensation does not violate the employee's rights under the due process
clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Consti-
tution or under Article I, § 8 of the Minnesota Constitution." 428 N.W.2d at
77. Citing express language in subd. 3e(b) limiting the payment of temporary
total compensation, the court also rejected plaintiff's argument that he is enti-
tled to receive temporary total compensation after payment in full of economic
recovery compensation. I& Finally, the court rejected plaintiff's argument
that if Holman's obligation to pay temporary total compensation ended 90 days
after Parson reached maximum medical improvement, Sowles (Parson's em-
ployer when he injured his right knee) then should be required to pay Parson
temporary total benefits at 100% of the compensation rate because the first in-
jury was a substantial contributing factor to his present disability. Id-
76. 428 N.W.2d at 76. In other words, an unemployed injured employee
has no post-injury wage on which to compute partial benefits, and therefore
when total benefits terminate 90 days past MMI, the employee is no longer en-
titled to any wage loss benefits. To continue to pay any wage loss benefits
would mean a continuance of the total benefits since the employee is currently
not earning any wage.
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The court reached this holding despite its acknowledge-
ment that the amended statute's limitations on partial wage
loss benefits are not stated with "compelling clarity."77 The
court further recognized that, by mandating an employer's obli-
gation to pay partial wage loss benefits to a disabled employee
who secures other employment78 and eliminating an employer's
obligation to do the same for the disabled employee who re-
mains unemployed, the legislature "may well have created an
opportunity for employer abuse. ' 79 The court concluded, how-
ever, that the legislature, not the court, must make any needed
adjustments or corrections.80
Justice Wahl, in a dissent joined by two other justices,
81
specifically noted that nothing in the revised statute limits par-
tial wage loss benefits to those workers who find alternative
employment.8 2 The dissent rejected the majority's conclusion
that, by deleting the sentence providing partial wage loss bene-
fits to unemployed workers at the total compensation rate, the
legislature intended to eliminate wage loss benefits for partially
disabled workers who remain unemployed.8 3 Justice Wahl in-
stead reasoned that the amendment merely requires calculation
of partial wage loss benefits for unemployed workers on the ba-
sis of earning capacity, rather than at the total rate as the old
law required.8 4 The dissent concluded that contrary to the ma-
77. Id.
78. Id. See also Gasper v. Northern Star Co., 422 N.W.2d 727, 730 (Minn.
1988) (holding employer must pay partial wage loss compensation to employ-
ees who secure other employment); Patton v. Thompson Elec. Co., 420 N.W.2d
596, 598 (Minn. 1988) (same); Winchester v. Pako Corp., 420 N.W.2d 587, 588
(Minn. 1988) (same); supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text (discussing Pat-
ton and Gasper).
79. Parson, 428 N.W.2d at 76.
80. Id-
81. The three dissenters were Justices Yetka, Wahl, and Popovich.
82. Id- at 78 (Wahl, J., dissenting). Justice Wahl specifically noted that
the court had acknowledged in Gasper that "the legislature's intent with re-
spect to temporary partial benefits is far from obvious." I&
83. Id.
84. Id. Justice Wahl emphasized that the court has "consistently held the
calculation of benefits under that portion of subdivision 2 left after amend-
ment is to be based on earning capacity, not post-injury wages." Id
Outlining the history of partial disability compensation, Justice Wahl
pointed out that at one time partial disability was calculated on the basis of
earning capacity. Id. After amendment of the statute, the commission fixed
the rate of partial compensation for unemployed disabled workers based on
the percentage of a worker's disability, but the rate for employed disabled
workers continued to be calculated on the basis of earning capacity. Id The
1974 amendments provided that unemployed partially disabled workers who
made a diligent effort to find work received partial compensation calculated at
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jority's assertion, reading the amended statute as providing par-
tial benefits to all disabled workers does not frustrate the 1983
legislature's intent.8 5 Rather, such a reading motivates employ-
ers to help re-integrate injured employees into the workforce
or else pay "significantly greater benefits.
'8 6
III. THE PARSON COURT'S MISINTERPRETATION OF
THE REVISED WORKERS' COMPENSATION
STATUTE
Parson presents the issue whether an injured worker who
is unsuccessful in finding alternative employment within ninety
days after reaching maximum medical improvement is entitled
to partial wage loss benefits at the total compensation rate.
8 7
No language in the 1983 amendments to Minnesota's workers'
compensation statute directly answers the question.8 Employ-
ing traditional methods of statutory construction, 9 the Parson
majority held that Parson, a permanently partially disabled em-
ployee, was not entitled to partial wage loss benefits at the total
compensation rate.90 The effect of the court's holding is that
injured workers who are unable to find alternative employ-
ment within ninety days after reaching maximum medical im-
provement are cut off from receiving any wage loss
compensation. The Parson majority confused the issue of
whether an unemployed injured worker who has not found al-
ternative employment within ninety days after reaching maxi-
mum medical improvement may receive wage loss benefits at
the temporary total rate. Employed disabled workers continued to receive
partial compensation based on earning capacity. Id-
85. Ia
86. Id.
87. 428 N.W.2d at 74.
88. See MINN. STAT. § 176.101 subd. 3p (1988). This section provides that,
upon reaching maximum medical improvement, a person with a permanent
partial disability not offered a job meeting subdivision 3e criteria shall receive
economic recovery compensation. Temporary total compensation ceases when
payment of economic recovery compensation begins, and temporary total com-
pensation cannot be paid concurrently with economic recovery compensation.
Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court has determined that a partially disabled
employee who attains re-employment may receive temporary partial compen-
sation concurrently with economic recovery compensation. Gasper v. North-
ern Star Co., 422 N.W.2d 727, 731 (Minn. 1988). The court explained that, since
temporary partial compensation replaces lost wages and economic recovery
compensation is a loss of function benefit, the two payments are separate and
distinct. Id- The issue in Parson regarding a worker who remains unem-
ployed, remains unanswered.
89. See supra notes 68-80 and accompanying text.
90. 428 N.W.2d at 76.
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the total compensation rate with whether that same employee
may receive wage loss benefits at the partial compensation
rate. In so doing, the court created an unnecessary loophole in
Minnesota's workers' compensation statute allowing employers
to avoid paying wage loss benefits to their injured workers sim-
ply because the injured workers are unable to find alternative
employment. The court's decision is the result of misinterpre-
tation of statutory language and misplaced emphasis on one leg-
islative goal to the exclusion of other equally important
legislative goals.
A. MISINTERPRETATION OF STATUTORY LANGUAGE
1. The Significance of Deleting Part of Subdivision 2 of the
Act
The-Parson majority correctly pointed out that the 1983
legislature deleted the sentence in subdivision 2 of the workers'
compensation act that had provided temporary partial wage loss
benefits at the temporary total rate to an unemployed injured
worker.9 1 As Justice Wahl noted in dissent, however, the ma-
jority -did not explain its rationale for concluding that by this
deletion the legislature intended to eliminate all temporary
partial wage loss benefits for employees who remain unem-
ployed ninety days past maximum medical improvement.92
An equally plausible construction, as Justice Wahl argued
in her dissent, is that by deleting the subdivision 2 sentence the
legislature merely wished to eliminate the reference to "at the
temporary total rate" for the unemployed injured employee,
not to extinguish all temporary partial compensation at another
rate.9 3 This alternative construction is consistent with the leg-
islature's goal of limiting the duration of temporary total com-
pensation. By deleting the reference to the temporary total
rate, the legislature simply was assuring that no injured em-
ployee would receive total compensation benefits beyond the
statutory period.
94
The revised language of section 176.101 subdivision 2 sup-
91. Id at 75. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
92. Id- at 78 (Wahl, J., dissenting). The Parson dissent, authored by Jus-
tice Wahl, who also wrote the Patton and Gasper opinions, argued that "the
legislature's intent with respect to temporary partial benefits is far from obvi-
ous." Id,
93. Justice Wahl argued that "nothing in the act specifically limits such
benefits to only those partially disabled workers who are employed." Id-
94. All statutory references to cessation of an employee's disability com-
pensation are to temporary total compensation. See MINN. STAT. § 176.101
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ports the conclusion that the legislature did not intend to limit
temporary partial compensation to employed workers. 95 Subdi-
vision 2 provides that "[i]n all cases of temporary partial disabil-
ity ... [t]his compensation shall be paid during the period of
disability except as provided in this section."96 "All cases" thus
includes the unemployed injured worker as well as the em-
ployed injured worker.
Subdivision 2 also provides that temporary partial compen-
sation shall be determined on the basis of the difference be-
tween the injured employee's weekly wage at the time of the
injury and the wage the employee "is able to earn in the em-
ployee's partially disabled condition."97 The statute specifically
says "able to earn," not "is earning."98 One who is unemployed,
while not earning a wage, still has the capacity to do so if given
the opportunity. Under the old law the court consistently used
an injured worker's earning capacity, not his post-injury wage,
to calculate the amount an injured employee is able to earn.99
As Justice Wahl correctly pointed out in dissent, nothing in the
revised statute indicates a legislative intent to eliminate the use
of earning capacity as the basis for calculating partial wage loss
benefits of unemployed injured workers. 00
2. Language in Related Subdivisions of the Statute
Subdivision 2 provides that temporary partial compensation
"shall be paid during the period of disability except as provided
in this section."'1 1 Only subdivision 3n of section 176.101 con-
tains language limiting the availability of temporary partial
compensation.10 2 Pursuant to subdivision 3n, a partially dis-
subds. 3d, e(a), e(b), e(d), f, j(b), 1, p (1988). No provision in the revised statute
refers to the cessation of temporary partial compensation.
95. See supra note 39.
96. MINN. STAT. § 176.101 subd. 2 (1988).
97. IM
98. IM
99. Parson v. Holman Erection Co., 428 N.W.2d 72, 78 (Minn. 1988) (Wahl,
J., dissenting). See supra notes 35-36 (explaining calculation of partial wage
loss benefits under the pre-1984 law).
100. 428 N.W.2d at 78 (Wahl, J., dissenting). The unemployed injured
worker's qualified rehabilitation counselor could calculate the employee's
earning capacity based on the employee's age, education, previous work his-
tory, interest, transferable skills, and present and future labor market
conditions.
101. MINN. STAT. § 176.101 subd. 2 (1988).
102. Subdivision 3n provides:
No temporary partial compensation or rehabilitation if job offer re-
fused. An employee who has been offered a job under subdivision 3e
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abled employee loses her right to temporary partial compensa-
tion if she refuses an offer of a suitable job.10 3 Subdivision 3n
thus supports the view that an unemployed injured worker,
like Parson, who does not refuse an offer of a suitable job, is
entitled to temporary partial compensation.
A close reading of other subdivisions of section 176.101 fur-
ther supports the conclusion that unemployed workers should
not be denied partial wage loss benefits. Subdivision 3h affirm-
atively states that partial compensation benefits are available to
an employee who accepts a suitable job before the ninety-day
post-lMI period lapses. 10 4 The Parson majority concluded that
subdivision 3h, by limiting partial compensation benefits to an
employee who accepts a suitable job, supports its holding that
only employed workers may receive temporary partial compen-
sation.10 5 Nothing in subdivision 3h, however, provides that
only employed injured workers may receive temporary partial
compensation. In fact, in its Gasper decision, the court itself re-
fused to read subdivision 3h as providing that "only" when an
injured employee has a "suitable" job may he receive tempo-
rary partial compensation. 0 6 The court emphasized that the
legislature did not include express language denying temporary
partial compensation to those injured employees with non-suit-
able jobs, 0 7 and further stressed that it would not supply a lim-
itation that the legislature did not place in the statute.10 8 The
Parson majority nonetheless apparently read subdivision 3h as
requiring that the only employees who may receive temporary
partial compensation are those who accept and begin a job. The
Parson court consequently did what it earlier had refused to do
in Gasper: read a limitation into the statute.
Analysis of section 176.101 subdivision 3p further suggests
and has refused that offer and who subsequently returns to work
shall not receive temporary partial compensation pursuant to subdivi-
sion 2 if the job the employee returns to provides a wage less than the
wage at the time of the injury. No rehabilitation shall be provided to
this employee.
MINN. STAT. § 176.101 subd. 3n (1988).
103. Id
104. See supra note 38.
105. 428 N.W.2d at 75.
106. Gasper v. Northern Star Co., 422 N.W.2d 727, 730 (Minn. 1988). See
supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
107. d. In the absence of a clear intent to the contrary, the court ruled
that employers must pay temporary partial compensation to disabled employ-
ees who find jobs, whether the jobs do or do not meet the statutory qualifica-
tions of suitability. See MINN. STAT. § 176.101 subds. 3e, 3f (1988).
108. Gasper, 422 N.W.2d at 730.
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that the revised statute does not preclude partial wage loss ben-
efits for workers diligently seeking jobs.10 9 Subdivision 3p pro-
vides that a permanently partially disabled employee without a
job ninety days after reaching maximum medical improvement
shall receive economic recovery compensation. 10 Noticeably
absent from subdivision 3p is a provision denying temporary
partial compensation to an injured employee who has no job
when her temporary total compensation ceases.,-: Subdivision
3p also does not specify that economic recovery compensation is
the only benefit available to an injured employee whose tempo-
rary total compensation has ceased." 2 The revised statute's
language requires no such interpretation. If the legislature had
intended economic recovery compensation to be the exclusive
remedy for the unemployed partially disabled worker ninety
days after maximum medical improvement, subdivision 3p
would have been the logical place to indicate this restriction.
Gasper, moreover, states that the statute provides just the op-
posite: economic recovery compensation and temporary partial
benefits are payable concurrently"
n3
B. MISPLACED EMPHASIS ON THE CESSATION OF TEMPORARY
TOTAL COMPENSATION
In reaching its holding in Parson, the court mistakenly
placed too much emphasis on the 1983 legislature's goal of elim-
inating the open-endedness of temporary total wage loss com-
pensation under the old law." 4 The elimination of open-ended
109. Subdivision 3p states:
No job offer. Where the employee has a permanent partial disability
and has reached maximum medical improvement or upon completion
of an approved retraining program, whichever is later, that employee
shall receive economic recovery compensation pursuant to subdivision
3a if no job offer meeting the criteria of the job in subdivision 3e is
made within 90 days after reaching maximum medical improvement
or 90 days after the end of an approved retraining plan, whichever is
later.
Temporary total compensation shall cease upon commencement
of the payment of economic recovery compensation. Temporary total
compensation shall not be paid concurrently with economic recovery
compensation.




113. 422 N.W.2d at 731. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
114. 428 N.W.2d at 76. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text. The
court noted that eliminating the open-ended nature of temporary total com-
pensation is an "integral" part of the new statute. 428 N.W.2d at 76.
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temporary total compensation, however, was not the 1983 legis-
lature's only goal in its revision of Minnesota's workers' com-
pensation law."L5 The legislature also designed the new statute
to include economic incentives that encourage employers to
provide suitable employment for their injured workers," 6 and
to include still other economic incentives that encourage em-
ployees to accept offered employment."17 The Parson majority
115. See supra note 27.
116. See Crochiere, supra note 23, at 652. Each of the following subdivi-
sions of § 176.101 demonstrates the legislature's attempt to incorporate eco-
nomic incentives that encourage employers to provide suitable employment to
their injured workers:
Subdivision 3a requires an employer to pay economic recovery compensa-
tion if the permanently partially disabled employee does not find alternative
employment. Economic recovery compensation is at least 20% higher than im-
pairment compensation. MINN. STAT. § 176.101 subd. 3a (1988).
Subdivision 3b requires an employer to pay impairment compensation,
which is at least 20% lower than economic recovery compensation, if the per-
manently partially disabled employee secures alternative employment. Id.
subd. 3b.
Subdivision 3c provides a maximum for impairment compensation and
economic recovery compensation. Id. subd. 3c. The old statute allowed "stack-
ing" of permanent partial disability benefits. MINN. STAT. § 176.101 subd. 3
(1979).
Subdivision 3e provides a cessation date for temporary total compensation.
MINN. STAT. § 176.101 subd 3e (1988). The old statute provided no such termi-
nation date. MINN. STAT. § 176.101 subd. 3e (1982).
Subdivision 3f provides that if an employer offers an injured employee a
job prior to maximum medical improvement, the employee's temporary total
compensation ceases. MINN. STAT. § 176.101 subd. 3f (1988).
Subdivision 3h provides that if an employer offers an injured employee a
subdivision 3e or 3f job, the employee's temporary total compensation ceases
and temporary partial compensation begins at a lower rate than temporary to-
tal compensation as provided in subdivision 2. Id subd. 3h.
Subdivision 31 provides that if an employer offers an injured employee a
subdivision 3e job and the employee refuses the job, the employee's temporary
total compensation ceases and the employer can pay impairment compensation
at intervals instead of in a lump sum. Id subd. 31.
Subdivision Sn provides that if an employer offers an employee a subdivi-
sion 3e job and the employee refuses the job, the employee is ineligible for
temporary partial compensation even if the employee later finds a job at a
lower wage. The employer also no longer must provide rehabilitation to the
employee. Id. subd. 3n.
117. See Crochiere, supra note 23, at 652-53. Each of the following subdivi-
sions of § 176.101 demonstrates the legislature's attempt to incorporate eco-
nomic incentives that encourage employees to accept employment offered to
them:
Subdivision 3i provides that if an employee begins a subdivision 3e job but
is laid off because of economic conditions, the employee receives monitoring
period compensation. MINN. STAT. § 176.101 subd. 3i (1988). This provision
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gave these latter two goals only cursory acknowledgement, 118
and instead focused on the legislature's goal of limiting the du-
ration of temporary total compensation.119
The Parson majority's reliance on the goal of providing a
termination point for temporary total compensation caused the
court to create an unfortunate loophole in the workers' com-
pensation statute. In previous cases the court held that employ-
ers must pay partial wage loss benefits to employed disabled
workers if their post-injury job pays less than their pre-injury
wage "for so long as the disability shall warrant."' 2 0 Parson
holds that employers do not have to pay partial wage loss bene-
fits to disabled employees who have not secured alternative em-
ployment by the time their temporary total compensation
ceases. 12 1
The loophole for employers is obvious: provide a job or
help your injured employee secure alternative employment and
your obligation to pay temporary partial compensation could
continue indefinitely; provide no job for your injured employee
and your obligation to pay temporary partial compensation may
never even begin.122 Parson, therefore, is inconsistent with the
eliminates the employee's fear of accepting a subdivision 3e job only to be laid
off shortly after the job commences.
Subdivision 3j provides that if an employee begins a subdivision 3e job but
cannot continue because of the original injury, the employee can again receive
temporary total compensation. Id subd. 3j. This provision eliminates the em-
ployee's fear of accepting a subdivision 3e job that she might later find did not
fit her physical needs.
Subdivision 3k provides that if an employee begins a subdivision 3e job but
is later unemployed because of seasonal layoffs, the employee can receive un-
employment compensation in addition to, and concurrently with, temporary
partial compensation. Id subd. 3k.
Subdivision 31 provides that if an injured employee refuses a subdivision
3e job offer, temporary total compensation ceases and no further temporary
total compensation is payable. Id subd. 31.
Subdivision 3m provides that if an injured employee refuses a subdivision
3e job offer, the employee's impairment compensation will be paid in intervals
rather than a lump sum. Id subd. 3m.
Subdivision 3n provides that an injured employee who refuses a subdivi-
sion 3e job offer and subsequently returns to work is ineligible for temporary
partial compensation or rehabilitation. Id subd. 3n.
118. See supra note 69.
119. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
120. Patton v. Thompson Elec. Co., 420 N.W.2d 596, 598 (Minn. 1988). Ac-
cord Gasper v. Northern Star Co., 422 N.W.2d 727, 730 (Minn. 1988);
Winchester v. Pako Corp., 420 N.W.2d 587, 588 (Minn. 1988). See supra notes
55-65 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
122. The court acknowledged that Parson "discourages an employer from
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legislature's goal of providing economic incentives that en-
courage employers to offer suitable employment to their in-
jured workers. Employees cannot accept jobs that are not
offered to them.
Furthermore, elimination of open-ended temporary total
compensation in the new statute does not require a finding that
the new statute also limits the availability of temporary partial
compensation. 23 The revised statute provides that temporary
partial compensation "shall be paid during the period of disabil-
ity except as provided in this section."' 2 4 No subdivision of sec-
tion 176.101 contains time-limiting language as to temporary
partial compensation. In Patton, the court interpreted the stat-
ute's language to provide temporary partial compensation to an
injured employee "so long as the disability shall warrant.'
' 2 5
Although the statute does not define "temporary partial disabil-
ity," the court, both under the old statute 26 and the new, 2 7 has
employed the designation in such a way as to suggest that an
employee is temporarily partially disabled when her physical
injury allows her to work but only at a job that pays a lower
salary than her pre-injury employment. s28 This interpretation
means that an injured employee is entitled to temporary partial
compensation for as long as she is unable to return to employ-
ment at her pre-injury wage. The unemployed injured worker,
like the employed injured worker, is unable to return to em-
ployment at her pre-injury wage and is entitled to temporary
partial compensation. Elimination of open-ended temporary to-
tal compensation thus does not require that only an injured
worker who finds alternative employment may receive tempo-
rary partial compensation:
A final problem with Parson is that it removes the
providing post-injury employment," but contended that such a result "does not
justify judicial reconstruction of the Workers' Compensation Act." 428 N.W.2d
at 76.
123. No language in the revised statute provides that temporary partial
compensation is time-limited.
124. MINN. STAT. § 176.101 subd. 2 (1988).
125. Patton v. Thompson Elec. Co., 420 N.W.2d 596, 596 (Minn. 1988). Ac-
cord Gasper v. Northern Star Co., 422 N.W.2d 727, 730 (Minn. 1988);
Winchester v. Pako Corp., 420 N.W.2d 587, 588 (Minn. 1988). See supra notes
55-65 and accompanying text.
126. See Morehouse v. George A. Hormel & Co., 313 N.W.2d 8, 10 (Minn.
1981).
127. See Gasper, 422 N.W.2d at 730; Patton, 420 N.W.2d at 598; Winchester,
420 N.W.2d at 588.
128. See Gasper, 422 N.W.2d at 730; Patton, 420 N.W.2d at 598; Winchester,
420 N.W.2d at 588; Morehouse, 313 N.W.2d at 10.
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worker's incentive to continue trying to find alternative em-
ployment. 2 9 Interpreting the old workers' compensation stat-
ute, the court consistently distinguished between injured
employees who diligently tried to find alternative employment
and those who did not.130 If the legislature intended to take
away temporary partial compensation from injured employees
who make a diligent effort to find alternative employment, it
would have included such a provision in the revised statute. By
tying continued temporary partial benefits to an employee's
continued diligent search to find alternative employment, the
legislature achieves its goal of creating incentives for the in-
jured worker to secure alternative employment.'
3 '
C. A SOLUTION TO PARSON
Parson, together with the court's earlier decisions inter-
preting Minnesota's workers' compensation statute, creates a
legal anomaly. Partially disabled workers who cannot find al-
ternative employment may receive only loss of function bene-
fits while partially disabled workers who find alternative
employment may continue to receive both loss of function ben-
efits and wage loss benefits. Although the Minnesota Legisla-
ture has amended the workers' compensation statute since
Parson, none of the subsequent amendments corrects the prob-
lem that Parson creates.132 In order to eliminate Parson's legal
129. See supra note 69. Although one might argue that an unemployed in-
jured worker would be motivated to find employment after wage loss compen-
sation has ceased, the circumstances of an employee in such a situation refute
that argument. An injured employee's temporary total compensation contin-
ues until 90 days past maximum medical improvement. MINN. STAT. § 176.101
subd. 3e(a) (1988). By that time the injured employee should have worked
with a qualified rehabilitation consultant to develop a rehabilitation plan, in-
cluding a plan for the employee to return to her original job or to secure alter-
native employment. MINN. STAT. § 176.102 subds. 1, 4(c) (1988). To continue
receiving temporary total compensation for the 90 days after maximum medi-
cal improvement, the injured employee must "make a good faith effort to par-
ticipate in a rehabilitation plan." Id subd. 13. It belies human nature to
believe that an injured employee, who has not received an offer of alternative
employment from her employer by the time her temporary total compensation
ceases and also has been unsuccessful in securing employment elsewhere even
with the assistance of a qualified rehabilitation consultant, will be motivated to
search for other employment on her own if all her wage loss compensation has
already terminated.
130. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (citing cases interpreting
pre-1984 workers' compensation law).
131. See supra note 69 (citing court acknowledgement of several legislative
goals in enacting the 1984 statute).
132. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.101 (Supp. 1989) (annotation discussing
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loophole, the Minnesota Legislature should adopt the following
amendment:1 33
A BILL
Be it enacted by the Minnesota Legislature that section 176.101,
subdivision 2 is amended by the addition of the following
language:
A partially disabled employee (1) whose temporary total compensa-
tion ceases pursuant to subdivision 3e(a), and (2) whose employer
does not provide work that he or she can do in a temporarily partially
disabled condition, and (3) who, after reasonably diligent effort, is un-
able to procure such work with another employer, shall be paid sixty-
six and two-thirds percent of the difference between the weekly wage
of the employee at the time of injury and the wage the employee is
able to earn in his or her partially disabled condition. Earning capac-
ity of the unemployed temporarily partially disabled employee shall
be determined by the employee's qualified rehabilitation counselor.
With this amendment, the unemployed partially disabled
worker, like the employed partially disabled worker, receives
temporary partial compensation as long as the disability contin-
ues. 34 The employed partially disabled worker receives 66
2/3% of the difference between the pre-injury weekly wage and
the post-injury wage, 3 5 while a similar but unemployed worker
receives 66 2/3% of the difference between the pre-injury wage
and the wage the worker would earn if employed. The amend-
ment thus corrects Parson's loophole and provides incentives
for employers to assist in re-employment of disabled employees.
The proposed statute thus fulfills the goals of Minnesota's
workers' compensation law in a logical and compassionate
manner.
IV. CONCLUSION
In denying temporary partial wage loss benefits to an un-
employed partially disabled worker, the Parson majority misin-
1984-87 amendments). The 1984 amendments were not substantive in nature
but rather clarified the legislative intent of the 1983 amendments. The 1985
amendments revised section 176.101, subds. 3e(b), 3i, and 3t. The 1986 amend-
ments removed gender specific references and revised section 176.101 subd. 3e.
The 1987 amendments repealed section 176.242 subd. 3v.
133. MINN. STAT. § 176.101 subd. 2 (1988); see supra note 39 (quoting subd. 2
as amended in 1983).
134. Patton held that temporary partial benefits continue for the employed
partially disabled worker as long as disability continues. See supra notes 55-56
and accompanying text. The same rule should apply to the unemployed par-
tially disabled worker.
135. See supra note 39.
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terpreted Minnesota's workers' compensation statute. The
court incorrectly placed great emphasis on the 1983 legislature's
goal of limiting the duration of temporary total compensation
and ignored the legislature's other goal of providing incentives
for employers to assist in the re-employment of disabled work-
ers. The court thereby created a legal loophole that does not
encourage employers to provide alternative employment to
their injured workers.
The legislature intended that its 1983 revision of Minne-
sota's workers' compensation statute would provide incentives
for employers to help their injured employees return to work
as quickly as possible, and that the new law would provide in-
centives for injured employees to accept the offered jobs. This
Comment proposes legislative revision of the statute to over-
turn Parson and make clear that unemployed partially disabled
workers are entitled to wage loss benefits as long as they dili-
gently seek employment.
Mary M. Krakow
1989]
